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Abstract
This article surveys some of the critical events that took place in India in 2002, paying particular
attention to India’s uneasy relationship with Pakistan.  It also evaluates the significance of inter-
nal political developments, such as the significance of state assembly elections and the occur-
rence of riots in Gujarat.  The survey concludes with a brief examination of India’s economic
developments.
The landscape of international politics was purportedly
changed after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  In this context,
South Asia became a centerpiece in the effort to eradicate terrorism.  In the
immediate aftermath of September 11, India was among the most vocal sup-
porters of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan.  By the end of 2002, though,
familiar patterns of India’s political regime had reemerged.  At the domestic
level, there was a revival of communal riots.  Results from state assembly
elections indicated evidence of a gradual collapse of popular support for the
governing coalition at the center.  At the international level, the year brought
about a reactivation of border tensions with Pakistan, as well as an unex-
pected improvement in economic growth.
Indo-Pakistani Conflict
The year 2002 started ominously, amid heightened tensions between India
and Pakistan.  In January, India mounted a diplomatic offensive claiming that
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the December 13, 2001, attack on its parliament was tacitly supported by
Pakistan.  Shortly after the attack, India recalled its ambassador to Pakistan.
On January 1, 2002, India discontinued the Lahore bus service as well as the
Samhauta Express train service, both important symbols of Indo-Pakistani
de´tente.  In one of the largest troop movements since the 1971 Indo-Pakistani
war, India adopted a strategy of preclusive defense, namely, by massing the
border with troops.  Starting in January, as many as one-million Indian troops
were stationed along the Line of Control (LOC) separating Indian- and Pakis-
tani-held sections of Kashmir.  In response, Pakistan also mobilized troops
along its eastern border and across the LOC.
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, India expressed un-
conditional support for President Bush’s actions in Afghanistan and provided
support for his war on terrorism.  The removal of sanctions that the U.S. had
imposed in 1998–2002 after India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in
May 1998 signaled a trend in American foreign policy to give priority to the
issue of terrorism rather than non-proliferation.
The test of the Bush administration’s commitment to the war on terrorism
came about as a result of India’s insistence that Pakistan cooperate with India
on the release to New Delhi of accused terrorists based in Pakistan.  This
pressure became more intense on January 22, 2002, when the American Cul-
tural Center in Calcutta (Kolkotta) was attacked by four gunmen who killed
five police officers and injured 20 other individuals.  The Islamic terrorist
group Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islam (HuJeI, Movement for Islamic Struggle)
claimed responsibility for the attack on the American center.  Astonishingly,
because no Americans were killed or harmed, the attack was merely por-
trayed as a domestic terrorist dispute and received little attention in the
United States.
Nevertheless, India set out to unilaterally undertake an aggressive stance
against terrorism.  New Delhi issued a most-wanted list of 20 suspected ter-
rorists.  They included Ghazi Baba, the alleged mastermind of the attack on
India’s parliament on December 13, 2001, as well as the Srinagar bombing
attack on October 1, 2002.  Other suspected terrorists on the list included
Aftab Ahmed Ansari, believed to be responsible for the January attack on the
American Center in Calcutta.  Ansari was later arrested in Dubai while travel-
ing with a Pakistani passport, and eventually deported back to India for trial.
Relying on the much-contested international law concept of hot pursuit,
India sought to capture terrorists living in Pakistan and in Pakistan-held terri-
tory in Kashmir.  India also threatened to withdraw Most Favored Nation
status and abrogate the Indus Water Treaty.  The Pakistani response to Indian
demands was predictably caustic.  India, though, was surprised by the re-
straint that Washington showed in its demands that Pakistan cooperate with
India on this matter.  Eventually, the U.S. designated two Pakistani-based
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Kashmiri terrorist groups, Lashkar-e-Toiba (Army of the Pure, LeT), and
Jaish-e-Mohammed [Legion of Mohammed, JeM], as foreign terrorist organi-
zations.  In turn, Pakistan outlawed these organizations.
After intensive pressure from international institutions and U.S. officials,
the tensions between both countries appeared to attenuate somewhat, particu-
larly after Pakistan’s president, General Pervez Musharraf, and India’s prime
minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, shook hands on January 5, 2002, at a meeting
of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Kath-
mandu, Nepal.  Nevertheless, the threat of war between India and Pakistan
had caused great concern among some American government officials.  For
instance, in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet expressed alarm
when he argued that “[t]he chance of war between these two nuclear-armed
states is higher than at any point since 1971.  If India were to conduct large-
scale offensive operations into Pakistani Kashmir, Pakistan might retaliate
with strikes of its own in the belief that its nuclear deterrent would limit the
scope of an Indian counterattack.”  Although Tenet acknowledged that India
and Pakistan had underplayed the significance of the troop movements along
the LOC, he added that “[w]e are deeply concerned, however, that a conven-
tional war—once begun—could escalate into a nuclear confrontation.”1
The U.S. response to the January standoff was restrained, as it was largely
viewed in Washington as stemming from India and Pakistan’s long-standing
tensions over Kashmir.  In this light, the U.S. has attempted to provide some
diplomatic help in resolving the Kashmir conflict.  Assistant Secretary of
State for South Asia Christine Rocca visited India in April to try to assess the
effort to solidify potential future talks on the region.
Despite the initial external diplomatic efforts, the continuing war of words
between Vajpayee and Musharraf hinted that the tensions were much deeper
than presumed by most Washington officials.  For instance, in an interview
with the German magazine Der Spiegel, Musharraf hinted that he was pre-
pared to use nuclear weapons in case of a war with India.  He said that if the
pressure was great, “In an emergency, even the atom bomb can also be con-
sidered.”2
The border tensions between both countries were stoked by India’s accusa-
tions that Pakistan was allowing border crossings into Indian-held territory in
the disputed state of Kashmir.  The objectives of the border crossings soon
became apparent.  On March 30, an Islamic Front suicide squad entered the
Raghunath Temple in Jammu, killing eight people.  Two weeks later, on May
1. Tenet’s full testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 6, 2002, can
be found at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/dci_speech_02062002.html>.
2. Translation from the German by the author. Der Spiegel, April 8–15, 2002, p. 170.
INDIA IN 2002 189
14, bilateral tensions reached a new height after an attack on Indian military
personnel near the Kaluchak army camp in Jammu.  Posing as Indian
soldiers, three terrorists opened fire on a bus carrying Indian army personnel
and their families, killing 32 people and wounding 43 others.
The escalation of terrorist attacks in Jammu elicited an aggressive response
from New Delhi.  By the end of May, Indian government officials openly
discussed the possibility of crossing the LOC and launching air strikes
against suspected terrorist camps in Pakistan-held Kashmir.  A more elabo-
rate plan, comically dubbed Operation Salami Slice, proposed a joint air and
infantry attack across the LOC in order to destroy the terrorist camps that dot
the region.
The escalation of border tensions led to a familiar brand of rhetorical
brinkmanship.  In a May 22 speech before Indian troops stationed in
Kupwara, near the scene of the May 14 attack, Vajpayee expressed rage at
the massacre and declared that “[w]e know how to respect the enemy.  But it
should not be construed as our weakness, nor should anyone think that we
would indefinitely go on tolerating things.”  He concluded that “our aim
should be victory—as the time has come to fight a decisive battle.”3
A day after his speech at Kupwara, Vajpayee began to backtrack from the
impassioned remarks he made before his soldiers.  In a chaotic press confer-
ence held in Srinagar, Vajpayee was asked repeatedly what he meant by the
words “decisive battle.”  The prime minister hesitated to elaborate, merely
calling the situation “serious” and “challenging.”  When asked specifically,
“When will the war across [the border] be?” Vajpayee responded with an
inconclusive “Just see what happens in the future.”
It would be an understatement to say that the year 2002 has proven chal-
lenging for India.  In order to deter further threats from Pakistan, India has
adopted an unswerving strategy of resoluteness in facing challenges, invest-
ing in a reputation for strength.  Given India’s known superiority in conven-
tional forces, this strategy should yield short-term deterrence equilibrium.
However, the asymmetric level of information about each other’s actual nu-
clear capability between both countries, as well as the level of uncertainty
about future payoffs, could have a corrosive effect on investing in reputation.
Fearing the increased probability of nuclear conflict, Washington decided
to intervene more decisively on behalf of India’s concerns about alleged
Pakistani-sponsored infiltrations by jehadi (Islamic militant) terrorist groups.
The American interest in the issue was enlivened once it became apparent to
American officials that Sunni extremist groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ,
Army of Jhangvi, named after one of the founders, Maulana Jhangvi), had
3. The full text of the speech is available at the Government of India’s Ministry of External
Affairs, <http://www.meadev.nic.in/speeches/pm-kupwara.htm>.
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ties to the al-Qaeda terrorist network.  In May and August, Deputy Secretary
of State Richard Armitage visited India.  In August, Secretary of State Colin
Powell also made a trip.  While acknowledging the problem of border infil-
trations by jehadi terrorists, Powell also manifested some concern about the
fate of political prisoners in Kashmir.
Despite the declining state of his health, Vajpayee reciprocated Armitage’s
and Powell’s visits on the eve of the anniversary of September 11.  The active
intervention by Washington officials, coupled with the macroeconomic reali-
ties of funding deployed troops, eventually prompted India to reconsider its
massive military mobilization along the LOC.  It is likely that given the out-
come of the general election in Pakistan giving Islamist parties a critical
share of the seats in Parliament, Indo-Pakistani relations will veer toward a
more vitriolic trajectory.
National Political Intrigue
The ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan often overshadowed other
critical internal political developments in India.  At the national level, one of
the most prominent changes was the stepping down of K. R. Narayanan as
India’s eleventh president.  Under the country’s constitutional provisions,
Narayanan could have been renominated by the majority party in parliament.
Despite his uneasy relationship with the ruling party, Narayanan remained the
likely front-runner for renomination.  However, the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) put forth A. J. P. Abdul Kalam as its surprising choice for president.
Abdul Kalam’s only other challenger was Lakshmi Saighal, the nominee
from the leftist parties.
The BJP used this occasion to send a dual message.  Abdul Kalam’s nomi-
nation was pregnant with symbolism.  Obviously, by nominating a Muslim,
the BJP was sending a strong message for domestic consumption, namely
that it was willing to shed its communal image.  The nomination of Kalam,
the architect of India’s nuclear program, also highlighted the perception that
India is trying to project internationally.  On July 18, Abdul Kalam received
89.6% of the electoral college vote.
The virtually unobstructed election of Kalam to the presidency did not ob-
scure more critical leadership problems in India.  Over the last few years,
Vajpayee’s mounting health problems have posed a severe obstacle to his
ability to govern.   Moreover, the BJP’s failed efforts to resolve the internal
contradiction within its governing coalition came to the fore during a dra-
matic reshuffle of the cabinet.  In its ever-insatiable hunger for hyperbole, the
Indian press compared the current cabinet changes to those undertaken by
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Jawaharlal Nehru, namely the so-called Kamaraj Plan.4  In what will proba-
bly prove to be a completely inconsequential move, Defense Minister Jas-
want Singh was ordered to trade ministerial portfolios with Finance Minister
Yashwant Sinha.  Having had three years to demonstrate their administrative
mediocrity, it is unlikely that neither Singh nor Sinha will inspire the type of
international confidence that India needs.
The cabinet reshuffle had a more important effect.  In order to appease
waning support within its Hindu-revivalist framework, Vajpayee promoted L.
K. Advani to the post of deputy prime minister.  Advani’s promotion also
coincided with the dismissal of Arun Jaitley from the cabinet.  Given
Vajpayee’s obvious inability to provide vigorous leadership, Jaitley had been
floated as his possible successor, particularly since he had done a credible job
in his function as minister of law, justice, and company affairs.  In that role,
Jaitley had  the unenviable task of shepherding a controversial anti-terrorism
bill. The new law, referred to as the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance
(POTO) was passed in a joint session of parliament a week after it had been
struck down at the Rajya Sabha (Upper House).  Building upon existing anti-
terrorist provisions in the National Security Act of 1980 and the Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1987 (TADA), POTO was contro-
versial because it allowed the executive to intercept various communications
protocols.  The law also burdened accused defendants with the presumption
of guilt and provided for the secrecy of witnesses.
Although the passage of POTO outraged civil libertarians, Jaitley still re-
mained among the BJP’s most urbane and visible national figures.  Jaitley’s
connection with the fight against Pakistani-sponsored terrorism also helped
boost his profile.  The criticism of POTO was muffled in light of other expe-
dient developments.  For instance, on April 1, 2002, a Delhi court declared
Jaish-e-Mohammed’s leader, Masood Azhar, and two other Pakistani nation-
als as the alleged perpetrators in the late 2001 attack on the Indian parlia-
ment.  The apprehension of dangerous terrorists occurred concurrently with
the passing of controversial anti-terrorist legislation.  Making use of the legal
provisions, 62 suspects accused of involvement in the violent riots in Gujarat
were also detained.
The government’s ability to fight terrorism was undermined by an unman-
ageable controversy surrounding Jaitley.  He was severely chastised by the
BJP’s congressional opposition for claiming that the press had sensational-
4. The Kamaraj Plan (1963) refers to an administrative proposal drafted by Congress Party
president H. Kamaraj, then chief minister of Madras.  The plan called for central government
cabinet ministers and state chief ministers of the Congress Party to resign their posts and to take
on party organizational work at the local level.  Although the proposal’s desired goal fell short in
its implementation, the Kamaraj Plan eventuated in some high-profile resignations by members
of Jawaharlal Nehru’s cabinet, and contributed to a brief renewal of party leadership.
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ized its reporting of the communal massacres in Gujarat.  Due to the BJP’s
delicate connection with the issue of communalism, Jaitley rapidly became an
inconvenient figure for the BJP.  His ouster from the cabinet signaled pro-
tracted ambiguity as to who the likely successor to Vajpayee will be.  The
wisdom of this decision will become clearer once Vajpayee’s mounting
health problems destroy his existing resolve to remain in office.
State Assembly Elections and Their
Ramifications
The year 2002 was also filled with intrigue relating to the outcome of various
state assembly elections.  India’s largest state, Uttar Pradesh, held state as-
sembly elections beginning on February 14.  The elections took place against
the backdrop of a provocative effort by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, the
World Hindu Council, an extremist Hindu chauvinist youth group) to begin
construction of four temple gateways within 67 acres of land controlled by
the Union government.  The VHP threatened to carry out this task on March
12 to coincide with the Hindu festival of Shivratri.  The dispute over the
construction of a Hindu temple on the grounds of the demolished Babri Mas-
jid precipitated some of India’s most shocking communal violence in over a
decade.  On February 27, a train carrying hundreds of VHP kar sevaks (vol-
unteers) from Ayodhya stopped at the Godhra railway station in Gujarat.  The
train was attacked and firebombed, leading to the death of 57 kar sevaks.
This reprehensible attack was followed by indiscriminate revenge attacks
against Muslims.  Steven Wilkinson, a noted scholar of ethnic conflict in In-
dia, concluded, “[I]n many instances, the violence was targeted and highly
organized, with rioters having apparently obtained detailed lists of Muslim-
owned houses, flats and shops.”5  Police inaction toward atrocities and other
mounting evidence—such as the use of voter lists and other official docu-
mentation to target Muslim households and businesses—also suggest some
level of state involvement in this massacre.6
Surprisingly, the violence in Gujarat did not mar the conduct of the state
assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh, perhaps underscoring the role that the
state has played in preventing violence.  The electoral results, though, repre-
sented a noteworthy setback for the BJP.  Although the party had been able to
form a state government, it experienced an unexpected drop in electoral sup-
port, coming third in the polls and losing 41 seats in Uttar Pradesh’s 403-
5. Steven Wilkinson, “Putting Gujarat in Perspective,” Economic and Political Weekly, 37:17
(April 27-May 3, 2002), p. 1579.
6. Compelling evidence is provided for in a 70-page report released by Human Rights Watch,
a respected human rights organization based in the United States.  See Smita Narula et al., “We
Have No Orders to Save You: State Participation and Complicity in Communal Violence in
Gujarat,” Human Rights Watch  14:3 (April 2002), <http://hrw.org/reports/2002>.
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member assembly.  The Samajwadi Party (SP) received the largest percent-
age of seats, followed by the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).  Accordingly, the
BJP was forced to form a coalition with the BSP.  The outcome of this alli-
ance was that the BJP’s chief minister, Rajnath Singh, was replaced by BSP
leader Mayawati.  After the elections, a major crisis was averted once it be-
came clear that the proposed start of temple construction would undermine
the BJP’s coalition government at the federal level.
One of Mayawati’s first legislative acts as chief minister was to overturn
Rajnath Singh’s affirmative action program used to hire public employees.
Rajnath Singh’s measure had been ensnared in legal challenges, which had
prevented the potential hiring of thousands of lower-caste public employees.
Even in the vaudevillian context of Uttar Pradesh’s politics, Rajnath Singh’s
scheme was illogical, as the state government faced a staggering fiscal crisis
that prevented it from paying its existing public employees.  More alarm-
ingly, Mayawati’s repeal will enable the Uttar Pradesh state government to
hire those individuals, thus certainly aggravating its fiscal woes.
State assembly elections were controversial, even in their absence.  The
state of Gujarat, one of India’s magnets for foreign direct investment and
portfolio equity investment, became the bellwether of the worst aspects of
Indian politics.  Citing the provisions in Article 174(1) of India’s Constitu-
tion—which limit the prorogation of a sitting legislature for a period no
longer than six months—Gujarat’s Chief Minister Narendra Modi cynically
saw the dissolution of the state assembly following the February massacres in
his state as an opportunity to call early elections.  A presidential reference to
Modi’s request tested India’s constitutional limits, prompting the federal
Election Commission to ask the Supreme Court to decide whether the presi-
dential reference on the holding of the elections was lawful.  Believing that
the situation in Gujarat during this period of communal turmoil was incom-
patible with a call for early elections, the Election Commission instead ar-
gued that Article 324 of the Indian Constitution—which grants this body the
responsibility to oversee free and fair elections—should override the provi-
sions in Article 174(1).
The potential for communal tensions in Gujarat was heightened when
members of an unknown Muslim radical group, called Tehreek-e-Kisaas
(Movement for Revenge), seized the Akshardham Temple in Gandhinagar on
September 25.  After the group killed 28 worshippers, Indian special forces
regained control of the temple.  Not wanting to further tarnish the central
government’s international image further, the attack against the temple did
not culminate with retaliatory attacks against Muslims, once again indicating
state complicity in the March massacre.  Instead, a nationwide hartal (strike)
was held to mourn the victims.  Nevertheless, in an election fraught with
appeals to Hindu chauvinism, the BJP went on to obtain a categorical victory
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once the Gujarat state assembly election was held in December.  The BJP’s
stunning electoral victory in Gujarat may embolden the party in future con-
tests.
The threat of communal violence has overshadowed equally critical struc-
tural problems in India’s polity.  Inconsistent government policies, often
rooted in populist political rhetoric or provincial power brokering, are widely
viewed as the main threat to India’s subnational economic growth.  Accord-
ing to a recent study by this author, India has the largest ratio of subnational
fiscal deficits as a proportion of total subnational revenue among all emerg-
ing markets.7  In a practice that will have long-term effects on economic de-
velopment, states in India have shifted the direction of subnational expendi-
ture from capital expenditure to covering current expenditures.  Within this
context, the outcome of various state assembly elections could have severe
implications for India’s subnational economic development.  Among India’s
largest states, Punjab has one of the poorest records of fiscal discipline.  The
BJP-Shiromani Akali Dal coalition government, under the leadership of
Prakash Singh Badal, ran a fiscal deficit nearing 40% of Punjab’s net state
domestic product.
Prior to the February elections in Punjab, Badal tried to consolidate sup-
port for the ruling coalition through a redistributive program called Sangat
Darshan (A Relevant Vision).  The scheme redirected development and wel-
fare expenditures from contributions by the state’s rural development fund.
Following a polarizing electoral campaign, the state assembly elections in
Punjab provided some hope for the median voter.  Running on a platform of
fiscal restraint and competent leadership, the Congress Party mustered a nar-
row margin of victory, securing a mere 36.5% of the vote.  The BJP-
Shiromani Akali Dal coalition government lost a combined 47 seats in Pun-
jab’s 117-member state assembly.
The results of the state assembly elections offered mixed messages about
the capacity of the BJP to continue to head a multiparty coalition at the
center.  The defeats of the BJP in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab were also coupled
with Congress Party victories in state assembly elections in Uttaranchal and
Manipur.  This trend signals a gradual disintegration of the BJP’s hold at the
regional level and a revival of the Congress Party.  On the eve of the BJP-led
National Democratic Alliance in 1998, the BJP ruled in eight states.  By the
end of 2002, only four state governments in India (Gujarat, Orissa, Himachal
Pradesh, and Jharkhand) were headed by the BJP or by a BJP-supported alli-
ance.  In terms of regional leadership, the BJP can only count on Gujarat’s
7. See Lawrence Sa´ez, “Globalization and Federalism in Emerging Markets,” Yale Center of
International Studies, Globalization and Self-Determination Working Paper Series, 2002.
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controversial chief minister, Narendra Modi, as its most recognizable re-
gional figure at the national level.
The state assembly elections also highlighted the continuing trend of politi-
cal redemption among India’s most colorful and disgraced politicians.  The
Uttar Pradesh polls enabled the revival of Mayawati in her third stint as chief
minister.  In another surprising revival of political fortunes, Jayalalitha, the
repeatedly disgraced general secretary of the All India Anna Dravida Munne-
tra Kazhagam (AIADMK) and former chief minister of Tamil Nadu, won a
constituency election in Andipatti.  It is only in the midst of this political
leadership vacuum that a vacuous quasi-politician like Congress Party leader
Sonia Gandhi can appear to be a refreshing alternative.
The most widely anticipated state assembly elections of the year, though,
took place in October, when the troubled state of Jammu and Kashmir held
its first such elections since 1987.  The inauspicious prelude to the elections
included the murder of Abdul Ghari Lone, a moderate leader in Kashmir’s
largest separatist alliance, the All-Party Hurriyat Conference.  Having pub-
licly criticized Pakistan for interfering in Kashmiri affairs, Lone was also one
of Kashmir’s most visible opponents of political violence.  The assassination
was carried out by gunmen dressed in police uniforms, thus signaling the
sophisticated level of planning by the murderers.
Given the continuing conflict between India and Pakistan, the state assem-
bly elections carried potentially international repercussions.  In the belief that
legitimate state assembly elections would add credibility to India’s rule over
the region, the principal Kashmiri separatist parties boycotted the election.
Various fringe Kashmiri separatist terrorist groups desperately tried to scare
voters from the polls, either through murder or intimidation.  On September
11, Kashmiri terrorists murdered Mustaq Ahmad Lone, the state’s law minis-
ter.  The elections were carried out in an ambience of intimidation, including
reports that some police officers had forced some unwilling voters to the
polling stations.
The outcome of the elections in Jammu and Kashmir was relatively incon-
sequential; their significance was that they took place at all.  Nevertheless, in
keeping with a nationwide rejection of the BJP and its allies, the National
Conference, headed by Farooq Abullah and his son Omar Abdullah, suffered
its worst electoral performance ever in the state.  Although the National Con-
ference won a plurality of the vote, it was not able to form a government.
Instead, the People’s Democratic Alliance (the third largest vote-getter in the
election) was able to form a coalition government with the Congress Party.
Despite the fact that more than 800 people died in election-related violence,
the voter turnout was high, approaching 46%.  In light of previous rigged
elections in Jammu and Kashmir, this was perhaps the most notable example
of a growing desire by Kashmiris for peace in the region.
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Economy
Diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan appear to have followed a
predictable pattern of escalation occasioned in large measure by terrorist at-
tacks on Indian soil followed by a brief diffusion of tensions in response to
external diplomatic pressure.  Surprisingly, little effort has been made to
strengthen the economic ties between South Asian nations and the United
States.  For instance, India is only the United States’s 25th largest trading
partner.
In a January 28 speech before the American Chamber of Commerce in
India and the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Ambassador Rob-
ert Blackwill described the trend in Indo-U.S. trade as being “as flat as a
chapati.”8  Blackwill’s colorful simile serves to remind us that trade could be
an optimal tool for increased diplomatic cooperation on other fronts.  Moreo-
ver, greater economic integration should have a salutory effect upon India’s
sagging macroeconomic performance.
India’s economic performance in 2002 improved dramatically after a disas-
trous year.  In the United Nation’s Global Economic Outlook, India’s eco-
nomic growth was projected to be 5.7% for 2002.  The Asian Development
Bank’s (ADB) Asian Economic Outlook forecast a 6.0% growth in GDP and
a decline in the ratio of fiscal deficit to GDP of 5.3.9  The recovery in the
Indian economy can be traced to a dramatic reversal in export competitive-
ness.  The ADB forecast a substantial increase in merchandise trade growth
from the previous year.  Merchandise export growth is anticipated to grow to
11% in 2002, compared to –1% in 2001.  Similarly, merchandise import
growth in 2002 reached a respectable 13% growth in contrast to –0.9% in
2001.
India continues to enjoy a comparative advantage in the delivery of infor-
mation technology (IT) enabled services.  The software and IT services in-
dustries, India’s fastest growing sectors, grew to 30,000 Rs crore ($6.2
billion) in 2002, compared to 28,350 Rs crore ($5.8 billion) a year earlier.
Other optimistic economic indicators included the increase in foreign direct
investment flows to India.  Foreign direct investment inflows were projected
at a respectable $4.3 billion in 2002, up from a modest $3.2 billion in 2001.
The long-term prospects for growth, though, are less definite.  As the
United States shifts its attention away from the region, it is less likely that
whatever support India has received during 2002 will continue.  Domesti-
cally, a decline in public spending may affect consumption demand.  Reflect-
ing growing consumer uncertainty and a tepid pace of industrial production,
8. The full text of the speech can be found at <http://usembassy.state.gov/posts/pk1/
wwwh02013003.html>.
9. See <http://www.adb.org/documents/books/ADO/2002/ind.asp>.
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by the end of October the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had already trimmed
its forecast for economic growth from 6.5% to 5.5%.  The RBI released its
revised growth estimate just as the government released its own projection of
8% annual GDP growth until 2007.  Internationally, the virtual derailment of
India’s sputtering privatization program and the continuing sectarian violence
in some of India’s most prominent states could only have a detrimental effect
on foreign investors’ confidence.
